If they succeed in creating an inclusive structure in virtually any peaceful form, Iraq succeeds. If they fail, the [U.S.-led] coalition fails almost regardless of its military success and that of the new Iraqi forces, and Iraq will move towards division, paralysis, civil conflict and/or a new strongman. |
If you pull troops out too quickly now, and you see the situation in Iraq collapse before the midterm elections, the impact is going to be far more serious than if you keep the troops in at reasonable levels. |
If, as is certainly possible, the situation devolves down to civil war or separatism, then no amount of military action can really deal with the problem. |
In reality in this city, on a bipartisan basis, everybody always spins the facts to support the policy they advocate. There are no innocents, ... you better tell policy makers there was a really good case for war. |
Iraq might be a far easier opponent than its force strengths indicate. But it also is potentially a very serious military opponent indeed, |
It would be naive to the point of being dangerously stupid. |
It' going to take time for this political process to unfold. Coalitions can take a long time to form, and delay isn't necessarily an indication of failure. |
It's 50-50 this thing holds together through the spring of 2006. But that is purely a guess. |
It's almost a creeping polarization of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines, We see a slow, steady loss of confidence, a growing process of distrust. |
It's an essential part of the broader strategy. |
It's an essential part of the broader strategy. But you won't have a situation where Iraqi battalions come on line and U.S. troops leave the next week. |
It's going to be 'Let's Make a Deal. The important thing in some ways was that there was a large vote. The concerns that it would fall along ethnic and sectarian lines were validated. |
It's posturing. The question is: What kind of clout does the political posture have? |
Logically, you do regroup after something like this and you~ don't go forward with the existing schedule, |
Much [insurgent] activity consists of bombings of soft civilian targets designed largely to provoke a more intense civil war or halt the development of an effective Iraqi government, rather than progress towards control at even the local level. |