[Karpinski tried to get information, but] nobody knew anything, nobody - at least, that's what they were claiming. The Company Commander, Captain Reese, was tearful in my office and repeatedly told me he knew nothing about it, knew nothing about it, ... Captain Reese said that not only did he know about it, but he was told not to report it to his chain of command, and he was told that by Colonel Pappas. And he claimed that he saw General Sanchez out there on several occasions witnessing the torture of some of the security detainees. |
[Marcelo told her,] Ma'am, I'm supposed to tell you after you see the photographs that General Sanchez wants to see you in his office. ... before I even saw the photographs, I was preparing words to say in a press conference - to be up front, to be honest about this, that an investigation is ongoing and there are some allegations of detainee abuse. |
[The first time Karpinski got any clarification about the photographs was January 23, 2004. The criminal investigator, Colonel Marcelo, came into Karpinski's office and showed her the pictures.] When I saw the pictures I was floored, ... Really, the world was spinning out of control when I saw those pictures, because it was so far beyond and outside of what I imagined. I thought that maybe some soldiers had taken some pictures of prisoners behind barbed wire or in their cell or something like that. I couldn't imagine anything like what I saw in those photographs. |
[While accepting her] share of the responsibility ... were not the work of a few wayward soldiers and their female leader. |
Certainly I would be concerned but I would be equally concerned... that the pictures had not been released and you allow then any opposition to say 'but there is more'. |
How could (the military) hold me accountable when I had no direct access? ... How come they didn't hold Rumsfeld accountable. How is that possible? |
I've never spoken to any of them, |
Iraq was a huge country, and when you have people largely saying now, 'He may have been a dictator, but we were better under Saddam,' this Administration needs to take notice. And at some point you have to say, 'Stop the train, because it's completely derailed. How do we fix it?' But in an effort to do that, you have to admit that you made a few mistakes, and this Administration is not willing to admit any mistakes whatsoever. |
living conditions now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn't want to leave. |
Look how they've tormented me, what they've taken away from me, |
Thankfully we don't have any report but that might be as simple as soldiers being told what they can say to the media and what they can't say to the media, |
The most pronounced difference was when Miller came to visit. He came right after Rumsfeld's visit ... And he said that he was going to use a template from Guantánamo Bay to 'Gitm-oize' the operations out at Abu Ghraib. |
There was no coordination with me or Colonel Pappas. There was no discussion about chain of command. |
They can do whatever they want. They can make it appear anything they want, ... I will not be silenced. I will continue to ask how they can continue to blame seven rogue soldiers on the night shift when there is a preponderance of information - hard information - from a variety of sources that says otherwise. |
was told by Colonel Warren, the JAG officer for General Sanchez, that they weren't assigned to me, that they were not under my control, and I really had no right to see them. |